In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We derive a number of interesting results: i) Political competition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the elimination of political rents. ii) Agents utilize the separation of powers in order to endogenously select institutions which restrict the power of politicians. iii) In conjunction with political competition, these institutions implement the Lindahl allocation in the economy as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game. iv) As a consequence of the previous result, political rents are zero in equilibrium, in the sense that the politician in government does not extract part of the social surplus because of his power. To the best of our knowledge, this in the only citizen-candidate model with this equilibrium property.
Introduction
Economies with public goods present complications that do not exist when all goods are private, a problem that has been acknowledged since the early literature of economic thought (Wicksell, 1896 , Lindahl, 1919 1 . The main issue resides with the fact that public goods, by their very nature, are not excludable or are only partially excludable, so that, all agents in the economy can derive some utility from their consumption once they are produced. This effect severely reduces agents' incentives to voluntarily share the required expenditure. Samuelson (1954 Samuelson ( , 1955 pointed out the inefficiency associated with allocations produced by competitive markets when public goods are present. Individuals ignore the positive externalities they generate to others when they purchase public goods, resulting in allocations below the Pareto frontier.
A solution to this problem could be a centralized decision making system which takes externalities into account when calculating allocations to individuals. A natural starting point is to think of a benevolent social planner who commands agents how much to produce and consume of each good. Another approach is to think of a mechanism as a computer, which makes choices on the agents' behalf. Individuals send messages to the mechanism regarding their information and it computes the allocation of resources.
However, both approaches present an internal inconsistency problem for economic theory and so it is difficult to maintain them as foundations for centralized decisions. The benevolent social planner assumption is a very useful benchmark, but it contradicts another fundamental assumption of economic analysis, namely that economic agents are inherently selfish and act on their own best interest. To accept this assumption means that one is ready to accept that either agents act selflessly when in positions with economy-wide powers, or that a benevolent enforcement power outside the society exists. The theoretical inconsistency should be obvious. The institutional counterpart to a social planner is the government. But governments, like all social institutions, are run by economic agents and there is no reason to believe that individual interests are aligned with societal ones, unless some other economic forces compel them to do so (Buchanan, 1959) . Furthermore, a benevolent planner requires a social welfare function in order to be able to make choices. In economic environments, where the Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (1951) applies, a well-defined social welfare function does not exist and therefore the social planner lacks a vital criterion of choice.
Mechanism design literature, on the other hand, attempts to provide a way of efficiently extracting private information from agents, but leaves other questions unanswered. Specifically, it does not explain how a mechanism is created and established or why agents have an incentive to implement a certain mechanism over another. In other words, the mechanism design approach implicitly assumes that sufficient institutional arrangements exist such that the agents in the economy have the incentive to choose, from the set of possible mechanisms, one with certain desirable properties (see, for example, Groves and Ledyard, 1977 or Walker, 1981) . But, the questions of how these institutional arrangements emerge and how they are enforced remain open.
The purpose of this paper is to answer these two questions for the case of economies with public goods. We choose this environment, because the existence of externalities makes competitive markets inefficient in allocating resources and requires some form of centralization of decision making power. We show how agents may reach agreement on the type of political institutions selected and how these institutions lead to efficient social choices. The institutions that arise endogenously from the political game is the utilization of the separation of powers by agents (some of them choose to become politicians, while others choose to become legislators to set the constitution) and the constitution (a set of restrictions on the voting behavior of citizens and politicians). Therefore, institutional arrangements on collective decisions become a necessary prerequisite for efficiency in this case.
Furthermore, under general conditions, the sub-game perfect equilibria of our political game implement the Lindahl allocation of the economy, which implies that none of the agents has sufficient power to achieve his most preferred outcome (and essentially becoming a social dictator). Thus, political rents are zero, in the sense that, in equilibrium, the utility of an agent is not dependent on whether he is a politician or not. To the best of our knowledge, no paper in the voting literature so far has implemented efficient allocations implying zero political rents as Nash equilibria. In our paper, this outcome is due to political competition in conjunction with appropriate political institutions, and hence we highlight the importance of these two factors in eliminating political rents and achieving efficiency 2 . Our results hold true under very general conditions. We only need the following three assumptions: i) An agent can become either a politician or a legislator, but not both (Separation of Powers), ii) the rules set by legislators apply equally for all agents, conditional on their characteristics, namely preferences and endowments (Nodiscrimination Principle), and iii) if no agreement is reached then each agent consumes the allocation he would have under competitive markets 3 . In order to demonstrate our results, in section 3, we start with a very simple model. We show why both political competition and political institutions are necessary conditions for the implementation of Lindahl allocations when political parties (or politicians) are exogenous. The economy we consider consists of 2 agents and 2 goods, one private and one public. Political parties are selfish entities which make proposals over the allocation of resources in order to extract as much of the social surplus as possible. Agents vote for their most preferred proposal and the party which wins the election becomes the government and implements its policy.
The political actions of the parties and agents may be restricted by the Constitution, which in this section of the paper is an exogenously imposed set of restrictions 4 . The constitution determines the dimension of commitment in political proposals, the votes required for winning the election by a party (the Election Rule), and the maximum amount of taxation, which a government can levy on citizens. We consider a particular form of the constitution, which specifies that political proposals are committing only for the level of the public good and not taxation levels, the election rule is the majority rule, and the maximum taxation on a citizen must be such that his marginal willingnessto-pay for the proposed level of public good is not violated 5 . Using the above constitutional rule, we examine three different cases in section 3. The first case assumes that the constitution limits taxation, but there is a single candidate politician. In this case, we show that the party acts as a social dictator and reaps as much political rents as possible, given the limitation it faces. In the second case, we allow for free entry of political parties, but we remove the maximum taxation restriction from the constitution and we replace it with the voters' participation constraint. In this case, we show that, despite the presence of political competition, parties still earn political rents. In fact, because the taxation restriction is removed, parties face weaker restrictions than the social dictator of the previous case and they may earn strictly higher rents than him.
In the third case, we allow for both political competition and the maximum taxation restriction to apply in the economy. We show that under these conditions the equilibria of the game are the Lindahl allocations of the economy and prove that political rents to parties are zero. We, thus, establish the necessity of both types of checks and balances over the power of government for efficiency.
In section 4 we move one step further and show how political institutions emerge endogenously, by extending the political game. In the first stage of the game agents decide what type of political power they want to hold from the two types available: legislative and executive power. Given theses choices, agents are distinguished into three classes, namely legislators, politicians and citizens. Therefore, we introduce separation of powers as a potential institutional control on the power of politicians, and agents in the economy choose whether to utilize it or not. Legislators determine the constitution of the economy, which is the set of political institutions that restrict voting behavior and political actions. Specifically, we allow legislators to determine how committing political proposals will be, what is the election rule and what is the constraint to maximum taxation. The rest of the political game, then follows the game in section 3.
We find that the extended game has a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, which implements the Lindahl allocation of the economy. Interestingly, legislators decide that politicians will be committed to the level of public good they announce but not to the taxation level. Instead they set an upper bound to the level of taxation politicians can impose, namely the maximum taxation constraint of section 3. With these restrictions endogenously derive all institutions, but the separation of powers and the anonymity rule.
5 We explain this definition of the maximum taxation constraint more thoroughly in section 3. It essentially implies that the taxation imposed by the government on an agent can not reduce his utility below the utility he would have received if he was on his offer curved for the specific level of public good implemented.
in place, and because of the free entry of candidates in the political arena, politicians can not extract social surplus by simply being in power. In other words, political rents are zero.
Therefore, the contribution of this paper is twofold: First, we show that political competition on its own is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the elimination of political rents. Appropriate institutions of control of political power are also required. Second, we show how the required institutions can emerge endogenously by the actions of the agents themselves, in order to facilitate the centralized decision making process and to avoid its breakdown.
Related Literature
Of course, there is a huge literature related to this topic. There is an extensive body of papers on voting games with simultaneous proposals. The main finding of these papers is that, if the proposing members are free to make any type of offer, then the corresponding voting games have generally no equilibrium. The theoretical literature has tried to overcome this problem by examining restrictions on preferences that would make them compatible with a notion of political equilibrium. It is not in our intentions to provide a comprehensive list of these articles. Some of the most noteworthy contributions are related with the work of Sen (1964 Sen ( , 1966 and Inada (1964) , but they restrict their analysis to triplets of preferences. Kramer (1973) provides a general characterization of necessary conditions in order for social welfare functions to be consistent with Arrow's assumptions and shows how restrictive these requirements can be. Plott (1967) provides a different notion of political equilibrium and demonstrates how general preferences violate the conditions required to satisfy it under a simple majority rule. Subsequently, Slutsky (1979) generalizes this result for any type of majority rules, including unanimity.
We approach the problem of social choice from a different perspective. Instead of restricting preferences, we introduce the constitution as a mechanism that restricts the set of proposals that political parties can offer and the way agents vote. We then show that a Nash equilibrium for this mechanism exists and this is our notion of political equilibrium. More importantly, however, we argue that the inability to create a wellbehaved ordering of social preferences should not be seen as an obstacle to social choice but rather a logical consequence of the conflicting interests of individuals with diverse preferences and endowments. Such a conflict should not be taken as evidence of inability for social action. Even if agents disagree on the desirability of social allocations, sufficient institutional restrictions may still enable them to make collective decisions or even attain social consensus.
In that respect, our approach is closer to the one adopted by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , though their implementation mechanism is quite distinct from ours. They adopt a sequential bargaining approach for the sharing of a private good, which is essentially a generalization of the sequential bargaining game by Rubinstein (1982) . Each agent in their model has a positive probability of being a proposer and if his allocation is objected by a majority of the agents, who vote for some other alternative, the bargaining process moves to the next round. The authors show that when the time discount factor is less than one there is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, where the first individual to propose makes an offer which the majority accepts. It is a general feature of their model that the first proposer has superior bargaining position compared to the rest so that some bargaining rents will accrue to him. On the contrary, our mechanism of simultaneous offers provides bargaining advantage to none of the proposals, even if we assume that they come endogenously from agents within the economy. Therefore our mechanism is more suitable for the elimination of political rents.
Nevertheless, many authors, following their seminal work, have demonstrated how social choices can be implemented through the mechanism of a sequential bargaining game 6 . Jackson and Moselle (2002) extend Baron and Ferejohn's model to the case where the economy contains public goods (alternatively, an ideological dimension). They show that, if there is a sufficiently high cost of delay, then the offer of the first proposing legislator will be approved and will contain a decision in both dimensions. The offer will trade part of the potential private good distribution gains for a compromise in the public good dimension and under this procedure there is a wide set of potential equilibrium proposals. The main modeling difference between our model and Jackson and Mosel are the same as the ones we discussed in the previous paragraph. Most importantly, however, the sequential approach generates allocations where the final quantity of the public good does not fully reflect the associated externalities and therefore it is under-produced. In contrast, the equilibrium outcome of our model implies the elimination of political rents and the efficiency of proposals, irrespectively of party identities.
More recently, Dávila, Eeckhout and Martinelli (2006) have proposed a similar sequential bargaining mechanism for the distribution of a private and a public good between two individuals. They find that as the cost of delay vanishes the equilibria of the game converge to the Lindahl allocations and so the inefficiency generated by sequential bargaining disappears. Due to the simultaneous nature of our game, though, the efficiency result of the proposals remains even if we were to assume strictly positive costs of delay. Also, it is not clear whether their result holds for more than two agents. Whereas, our model can be easily generalized to a large number of goods and individuals and it exactly achieves the Lindahl allocation as an equilibrium outcome.
Another strand of literature, which is closely related to our approach is the citizencandidate model, pioneered by Osborne and Sliviski (1996) . In their paper, each agent (citizen) in the economy decides whether to become a candidate politician or not and then citizens vote who is going to be elected to power under different electoral rules. The winner of the election chooses his most preferred policy. The authors show that the number of candidates in the second stage depends on the cost of running the campaign and the potential benefits of winning. They also show that the plurality rule generates more candidates than an electoral rule based on runoffs. Besley and Coate (1997) introduce the citizen-candidate framework into a multidimensional policy setting and examine the implications of the model for the efficiency of the final allocations. They also present an application of their model in economies with public goods. They show that an equilibrium of the game always exists, even though the policy space is multi-dimensional, and that the resulting allocations are Pareto efficient.
Despite the similar structure of political competition between the above papers and ours, there are some major differences as well. In both models (Osborne and Sliviski, Besley and Coate) , political institutions, the electoral rule and the commitment to political proposals, are exogenously imposed, while in our case they emerge endogenously. In other words, the case they consider, namely that politicians implement their most preferred policy when they are in power, corresponds to the case in our model where legislators decide that political proposals are not committing in any dimension. we show that if commitment is endogenous this case will never be chosen (that is, in our model, this case is off the equilibrium path.). We also assume implicitly that political entry is costless, while the assumption in these papers is that each citizen must pay some cost to become a candidate.
As a result, the properties of the equilibrium allocations in the two types of games differ substantially. The main difference is that in our case politicians do not implement their most preferred policy. In fact, the equilibrium allocations do not depend on the identity of the politician and as a result, as long as there are at least two candidates, there are no incentives for strategic entry. A second implication of this is that, in our model, political rents are zero in equilibrium, in the sense that, given a specific equilibrium allocation, the utility of an agent is not dependent on whether he is a politician or not. In other words, in equilibrium, becoming a politician does not provide additional benefit to a citizen. Obviously, in the political game of Osborne-Slivinski or Besley-Coate this does not apply, as the equilibrium utility level of an agent depends critically on his social identity (citizen or politician).
Mechanism design has also been used for providing allocations in economies with public goods. The main focus of this literature is how to assess the value of the public good when this is private information for agents. Groves and Ledyard (1977) propose a mechanism, which makes agents report truthfully their preferences over public goods and therefore it can be used by governments for taxation purposes. The problem of their mechanism is that, under certain preference profiles, it does not satisfy agents' participation constraints so that they may opt not to use the mechanism (if they are given the opportunity to do so). Smith (1977) and Walker (1981) propose alternative mechanisms, which can implement Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibria of their proposed game forms. As a result, both incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are satisfied. Tian (1989) also considers a mechanism, which can solve the public good provision problem in economies with multiple private goods and provides a continuous and feasible outcome function. However, none of these papers put any restrictions on the actions of the government, which means that the implicit assumption of a benevolent government is made.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature of political competition as a driving force for eliminating political rents. Stigler (1972) was among the first to point out the similarities that exist between political and market competition. In a similar way that competition among producers reduces their ability to earn abnormal returns, competition among candidates or political parties reduces the magnitude of opportunistic behavior and the adoption of socially undesirable policies. Wittman (1989) pushes the argument one step further, by presenting many features of the modern representative democracies as institutional designs of monitoring and control over the actions of politicians. Despite the existence of informational constraints on their actions or the bargaining power nested in their authorities, institutions, like political parties, elections or the structure of the legislative bodies, create a variety of reputation and competition considerations that prevent politicians from extensive abuse of their positions. Wittman's conclusion is that we should not expect the inefficiencies of the political system in democracies to be greater than the failures of competitive markets.
Though our analysis does not consider such a general set of institutional designs it is in line with the political efficiency argument. The main difference is that we are explicitly concerned with the issue of the provision of the public good and the role of political competition in solving it, while the aforementioned research agenda is centered around the elimination of political rents, whatever form they may take. We proceed as follows. Section 3 shows how the combination of political competition and the maximum taxation constraint implement the Linadhl allocation of a two-agent economy. Section 4 extends the analysis by allowing for multiple agents and for institutions to emerge endogenously. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Description of the economic environment and the mechanism
Consider an economy with 2 agents and 2 goods. Good 1 is a private good while good 2 is a public good. Let e 1 and e 2 be the endowments of the private good for agents 1 and 2 respectively. Agent i = {1, 2} has a well defined ordering of preferences which can be represented by a continuous, non-decreasing, strictly quasi-concave utility function u i (x i , y), where x i represents the consumption of private good for agent i and y represents the quantity of public good produced. The public good is produced through a linear production function F (z) = mz, where z stands for the aggregate quantity of private good used as input and m is a scaling coefficient.
As a benchmark case we define the allocation outcome generated by a system based on competitive markets. Each agent places an order of public good to firms so as to maximize his utility given his endowment and the order of the other agent. Firms, facing conditions of free entry, buy inputs from agents and try to maximize their profits. Assume that k is the number of firms operating in the economy, where k is a large number. Assume, without loss of generality, that the equilibrium allocation of resources under free markets is unique and is given by:
The resulting utility level for agent 1 and 2 is v
2 , y f m ) respectively. Let v f m be the vector of utilities, agents receive in the competitive equilibrium. Because of the nature of good 2, a f m is not Pareto efficient. There exists a feasible reallocation of resources that can make at least one of the agents better-off without making the other worse-off. At the same time, we allow agents to abandon any centralized decision making system, if it offers them less utility than what they would have got if they had acted in a decentralized economy. Therefore v f m is an effective outside option, which determines the individual participation constraints on any centralized allocation scheme.
Given the economic environment, we will highlight the importance of political competition for the efficient provision of the public good. In order to do so, we will initially take the institutional constraints and political parties as exogenous (we will relax these assumptions in the subsequent section). For now, consider the following centralized decision making mechanism manifested into a voting game dictated by the rules of a Constitution. The players of the mechanism are political parties (or alternatively politicians) and the 2 agents. A political party is an exogenous entity which makes offers of prospective quantities of public good to agents and tries to be elected as government. Parties exhibit risk neutrality and their utility is the probability to win the election in the voting game times the rents they receive from their offers: V p = p win r p 7 . Agents play the double role of being the consumers of the final allocations produced in the economy and voters, who decide which party will become the government.
The Constitution is a exogenous political institution which puts restrictions on the action sets of parties and voters. More specifically, it specifies the types of political proposals that parties can make, the way agents vote and how a government is elected to implement its proposed allocation. Agents vote for the party whose proposal provides the greatest level of utility for them. If agents are indifferent between two proposals, then we assume that they vote for each one of them with equal probability. The party which receives the majority of votes, wins the election.
Party proposals consist of only one element: a quantity of public good to be produced (y p ). Let P R p = {y p } denote the political proposal of party p. If a party is elected into power, then it will be called to implement the level of public good it proposed before the election. Note, however, that, while the party has committed itself over the quantity of the public good, it has not committed itself over the taxation levels that will be imposed on agents to finance its production. The only constraint, which we assume that is imposed on the government by the Constitution, is that the taxation each individual will pay can not exceed the taxation that the same agent would have paid for the proposed level of the public good if he was on his offer curve. This is equivalent to say that, given a specific proportion of aggregate taxation that an agent pays, the maximum taxation possible is one that gives the agent the same utility level as the one he would have obtained when the proposed level of public good was an optimal choice for the agent. For example, the maximum taxation possible for agent i for the proposed level y in Figure 1 (page 12) is equal to t i . For the rest of this paper, we will call this institutional restriction as the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint or the maximum taxation constraint.
However, on its own, this restriction is not sufficient to eliminate political rents, as we show for the case of a single party. A party that faces only this constraint can find levels of the public good for which the aggregate willingness-to-pay exceeds the required expenditure. The presence of political competition is also necessary for the elimination of rents. On the other hand, if there are more than one parties, but the Constitution does not impose the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint, then political parties can still earn political rents, despite the presence of political competition. Therefore, some form of institutional restrictions are also necessary for the efficient provision of public goods.
In order to show that political competition and institutional constraints are both necessary requirements for the efficient provision of the public good in this economy, we present the equilibrium of the game under 3 different conditions: i) when the Constitution restricts party proposals and imposes the maximum willingness-to-pay, but there is only one party in the economy, ii) when there are two parties in the economy, but there is not the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint (the only constraint is the standard participation constraint) and finally iii) when both conditions (multiple parties and the maximum taxation constraint) are satisfied.
Case I
Consider, first, the case when there is only one party, which has secured the control of the government and acts as a dictator. This provides a base of comparison for political competition. The party's objective is to maximize its rents given the constitutional constraint on policies, and hence it tries to find the level of public good, for which the summation of agents net valuation is the highest. More formally, the party's maximization problem can be described as:
The party's problem is straightforward. It needs to choose a level of public good such that both agents would like to contribute a share of their endowment as big as possible, so that political rents are maximized. The rents come from the fact that, at the proposed level of public good, aggregate taxation will be higher than the required resources for its production, so that the difference is received by the party. Below we show that, under relatively general conditions, these rents will be strictly positive.
Proposition 1: Under the assumption that u i (.) : R 2 + → R + is a continuous, nondecreasing, strictly quasi-concave function, which represents non-satiated preferences over normal goods, the maximization problem described above has at least one solution with strictly positive rents.
Proof: The party's maximization problem can be rewritten as:
The First Order Condition for this problem is given by:
The left-hand side of equation (1) is the marginal benefit to the party by an increase in the level of the public good, while the right-hand side reflects the marginal cost. Also, notice that s m i (y) is a continuous, decreasing function of y. Because of the assumptions of non-satiation and strict quasi-concavity of the utility functions, for every level of expenditure sharing s i there exists a unique level of public good y, such that agent i maximizes his utility. Furthermore as s i decreases the demand for the public good increases. In other words, the offer curves for both agents are decreasing functions of s i (as it is shown also in Figure 1 ). Essentially, s m i (y) is the inverse function of the offer curve and hence it is also a decreasing function of y:
< 0. First, notice that as y → 0, the left-hand side of equation (1) goes to 2, as both individuals are willing to shoulder the full burden of taxation for low level of public goods. At the same time, the right-hand side of equation (1) tends to 1, which means that the difference between the two sides is positive. On the other hand, as y → ∞, the left-hand side tends to 0, as individuals are willing to provide an infinitesimal part of their endowment for very high levels of public good, while the right-hand side tends to infinity, making the difference between the two negative. Since both sides are continuous functions of y, there exists at least one level of public good y * such that the two sides are equal.
Second, because The intuition for this result is simple. When only one party is allowed to operate in the economy it knows that it has full bargaining power over the population since its offers will go unchallenged, so long as both agents are willing to forgo a part of their endowment for the proposed level of public good. It therefore becomes a social dictator, using its power to provide allocations that maximize its rents. Because the marginal utility of the public good is higher than the marginal rate of transformation for both agents when its quantity is very low, proposals associated with positive political rents are easy to find. Of course, all such proposals are socially inefficient, since they imply excessive supply of resources into the production process and consequently waste (because politicians are exogenous entities, political rents are deadweight loss for the society.).
Case II
The main elements of the game are as in the first case. However, we assume that there are two parties in the economy and the maximum taxation constraint does not hold 8 . This means that parties are free to choose any taxation level after being elected in government, as long as the participation constraints are satisfied. In order to be more explicit, we present the structure of the game below:
Stage 1: Each party makes an offer on the level of public good.
Stage 2: Each agent decides which party to vote and the election takes place. The party which receives the majority of votes wins the election. In case of draw, one of the two parties is chosen randomly to implement its proposal.
Stage 3: The elected party takes over power and implements its proposal.
The removal of the maximum taxation constraint has an important implication for the equilibrium outcome. Because the party in power is not constrained over the level of taxation, political competition is rendered powerless. No matter what promises parties make in the first stage for the level of public good, the government will impose such a high level of taxation on each agent, so that he is indifferent between the market and the governmental allocation of resources. This happens because there is no effective commitment on taxation levels after the election has taken place.
Agents, anticipating this, understand that all proposals imply the same utility level for them, irrespectively of their promise over the quantity of public good. Therefore, they are indifferent between voting for one party or the other and vote randomly for one or the other. Political parties, of course, anticipate this as they realize that their commitment on the level of public good does not affect agents' voting behavior in the subsequent stage. Since the probability of winning the election is independent of its proposal for any party, the best choice for them is to commit on the level of public good that maximizes their rents after the election and simultaneously satisfies the participation constraints of agents. In this case, parties are acting effectively as social dictators. Proposition 2 summarizes the result.
Proposition 2: The equilibrium outcome of the 2-agent, 2-party game, without the maximum taxation constraint enforced by the Constitution, implies strictly positive political rents for the party that is elected in government.
Proof: In stage 3, whichever party is elected will impose the maximum taxation possible. Given that there is no commitment over the level of taxation in stage one by a party's proposal and that there is no constitutional restriction, the maximum taxation is the one that makes each individual indifferent between the allocation he would obtain by competitive markets and the one implemented by the government.
In stage 2, agents are indifferent between party proposals, as all of them imply the same utility level for each individual. Therefore, their vote can not affect the final outcome of the game and they vote randomly for either party. In stage 1, parties realize that their political offer has no impact on the voting rule of agents. Their best response is to set the level of public good so as to maximize their political rents. Formally, each party solves the following problem:
, 2} From the First Order Condition we get that:
This is a simple cost-benefit equation. It states that the party should offer a level of public good such that for the last unit of it, the marginal benefit of the extra taxation is equal to the marginal cost of the extra resources required for its production. Let y denote this level of public good. Also, from the total derivative of the participation constraint notice that:
This also implies that the summation of the ratio of marginal utilities is strictly greater than the marginal rate of transformation for all y < y:
The level of public good proposed by parties, provides them with strictly positive political rents. This is an important result. It shows that political competition on its own is not a sufficient condition for the elimination of political rents. Institutional restrictions are also necessary, a point that we will emphasize also in the next case. In fact, without the maximum taxation constraint, political parties can implement perfect price discrimination in the third stage of the game, so that the political rents for the ruling party will be at least as large the ones of the social dictator in case I, under any combination of individual preferences and endowments. This is because political competition is powerless if there are no restrictions on the maximum level of taxation and as a result parties face one less constraint than the sole party of the previous case. Once the maximum taxation constraint is reinstated, however, political competition leads to efficiency, as shown below.
Case III
The primitives of the economy and the political game remain the same as in the previous case, with the difference that the two parties in the economy face the maximum taxation constraint. An immediate consequence of competition is that parties can not secure election victory by simply satisfying agents' willingness-to-pay, as was the case with a single party. In fact political rents will be zero in equilibrium, irrespectively of the offer that will pass.
Proposition 3: Assume that the original economy has a unique Lindahl allocation. The political game as described above, with 2 agents, 2 parties and the Constitution as described in the previous section, has a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Both parties propose the level of public good that corresponds to the Lindahl allocation of the economy. Both agents are indifferent and vote randomly for either party. In the third stage, the party which receives most votes becomes the government, otherwise one party is selected randomly to implement the common proposal. In the last stage of the game, the party that wins the election will maximize its rents given the commitment it has undertaken in stage 1 regarding the level of public good. The implication of this is that agents will be asked to contribute their maximum willingness-to-pay in stage 3. If a party has offered y L , then it can not extract any political rents after election, since the maximum willingness-to-pay of the agents is exactly the same as the expenditure required for the public good. To see that, recall from the previous section that s m i (y) (the maximum willingness-to-pay of agent i) is a decreasing function of y and that the Lindahl allocation is defined as a sharing of the public good expenditure such that both agents agree on the demanded quantity. This means that s 2 (y) < 1. If a party ever offered y p > y L , then agents would anticipate that such a level of public good can not be implemented without violating their maximum willingness-topay and hence they would not vote for the corresponding party. On the other hand, if party p offers y p < y L , then agents, as we noted in the previous paragraph, anticipate strictly positive political rents for the party. Furthermore, both agents would be strictly better-off by an offer with a greater level of public good. This is because levels of y closer to the Lindahl allocation correspond to points on the offer curves with higher utility (See also Figure 1) . Therefore, if party p offers y p = y L , then the other party will lose the election with certainty if it makes any other offer. If party p offers y p < y L , then the other party can win the election with certainty by offering a quantity of public good slightly greater. Finally, any offer y p > y L is not credible, and party q can win with certainty by making any offer with y q y L . As a result, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium involves both parties proposing y = y L . The rest of the proposition follows immediately. The main intuition of the proposition is that, when competition is allowed, then parties can not maximize their political rents without taking into account the offers of their contestants. Since agents anticipate that parties can commit to the level of the public good, but not to the tax level, they will vote the proposal which minimizes rents. Note that the Lindahl allocation is the only credible allocation on the Pareto frontier. Political contesters understand this and make efficient offers. The resulting equilibrium of the game is represented diagrammatically in Figure 2 . The level of public good y m corresponds to the choice that a monopolistic party would do. Such a level implies strictly positive political rents for the government, as the summation of the maximum willingness-to-pay of the two individuals exceeds one. On the other hand, y L is the level of public good that is obtained under conditions of political competition and it corresponds to the level of public good under the Lindahl allocation L 9 . In the following section we focus on a different aspect of the game, the exogenous nature of the Constitution and of political parties. Proposition 3 seems to hold because of the way the maximum taxation constrained is constructed. In the following section we extend the political game and allow agents to create the Constitution and to make proposals for the allocation of resources in the economy. We thus allow the required conditions for the efficient provision of the public good to arise endogenously.
Separation of Powers and Endogenous Political Institutions
In the previous section we showed the importance of both political competition and institutional restrictions for the efficient provision of the public good in the economy. Most elements of the political game, however, were exogenously imposed and it would seem as if our results are derived by assuming the partial commitment of parties on their proposal and the maximum taxation constraint. In this section we will show how these elements of the institutional environment can arise endogenously, under minimal assumptions. Most importantly, we show what type of institutional arrangements can be used by agents in order to incentivize the government to provide efficient allocations of public good.
Consider an economy with n agents, where n 3. As in the previous section, there is one private and one public good. Each agent has an endowment e i of the private good and a utility function u i (x i , y), which satisfies the same conditions as before. Let the production function of the public good be also the same: F (z) = mz. Once again, let v f m be the vector or utilities that the agents of the economy receive, if the public good is provided by a decentralized mechanism (competitive markets). Of course, such an allocation is suboptimal. Finally, assume, that the economy has a unique Lindahl allocation (but as we note in footnote 9 this is not crucial for our results.).
Consider the following political game. In stage 1, agents decide what type of political power to hold. There are two types of power-holders: i) legislators and ii) politicians. Legislators decide the institutional arrangements (the Constitution) of the economy.
Politicians, participate in the election by making proposals over the level of public good to be produced. Once in government they implement their policy. Agents decide whether they want to become legislators or politicians or neither. However, an agent can not become both. If no agent becomes a legislator, then no Constitution is set and the politician elected in government has unlimited power (i.e. non-commitment of political proposals and non-existence of the taxation constraint is the status quo). On the other hand, if no agent becomes a politician, then no centralized decision is made and competitive markets decide the level of public good to be produced (i.e. the allocation a f m is the status-quo). In stage 2, legislators decide on the form of the Constitution. Specifically, they decide on three different institutions of political competition: i) which elements of a political proposal are committing if the respective politician rises to power, ii) how many votes a political proposal needs to receive in order to win the election, and iii) whether the government will face the maximum taxation constraint (as defined in the previous section) or not. In other words, legislators choose the institutional constraints for political parties and the government. Each legislator simultaneously makes a proposal on these three issues and according to a given choice rule, one of the proposals is chosen to be the Constitution of this economy.
The choice rule used for deciding the Constitution is inconsequential for the final outcome of the political game, as we will show later. For reasons of expositional clarity, we assume that the legislative proposal which is made by the majority of legislators becomes the Constitution. We also assume that the Constitution is binding for politicians. If any of its clauses is violated by the government or other agents, then the centralized decision making process breaks down and agents allocate resources through competitive markets (a f m ). In terms of the decisions, which the legislators make on the Constitution, the following assumptions are made. First, legislators choose whether political offers are committing for the level of public good only, for the level of taxation only, for both or for neither. In the case where legislators decide that proposals are committing on the dimension of taxation, we avoid issues of non-existence of equilibrium by adopting a sequential bargaining approach. Specifically, we assume that there are T stages of bargaining, T ∈ N . In every stage, each political receives an equal probability of being chosen to make a proposal. If the proposal wins more votes than the threshold set by the election rule (see below) then the politician wins the election. Otherwise, the procedure moves to the next stage. If the final proposal is not accepted then the agents return to the status-quo allocation (a f m ). All agents have the same discount factor δ. Second, the election rule can vary from simple majority of votes to any supermajority requirement, including unanimity. Third, legislators can choose whether to impose the maximum taxation constraint or not. But, the maximum taxation constraint is anonymous. It holds for either all agents in the economy or none. In other words, if an upper bound on taxation is set, it can not be the case that some agents in the economy enjoy this privilege while others are heavily taxed by the government. We call this condition the Anonymity of the Taxation Constraint.
If there is no restriction on the maximum level of taxation and no commitment over taxation during the election, then the government faces only one form of constraint: the participation constraint of agents in the economy, which, as we explained in the previous section, implies a lower bound to the utility level agents can receive by the centralized allocation, equal to v f m . Effectively, we allow any agent to block the formation of any centralized decision making mechanism, which gives him lower utility than the one he receives under competitive markets.
The rest of the stages are similar as the ones in the previous section. In stage 3, those, who have become politicians, make proposals over the quantity of public good and the level of taxation. In stage 4, each individual in the economy votes for one proposal and the proposal that satisfies the election rule wins. In stage 5, the politician who made the successful proposal, receives the power to levy taxation and implement the allocation of resources, given the restrictions of the Constitution.
Proposition 4: The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game in section 4, which arise under any preference profile that satisfies the assumptions of section 3, is characterized by the following outcomes: i) at least one agent becomes a legislator and at least two agents become politicians, ii) legislators set the maximum taxation constraint and decide political offers to be committing only for the level of the public good (not on the level of taxation), iii) each politician proposes the level of public good that corresponds to the Lindahl allocation, iv) agents are indifferent between political proposals and vote arbitrarily for any party, v) irrespectively of who is elected to government, the winner of the election implements the Lindahl allocation of the economy.
Proof: We prove Proposition 4 by backward induction. Because there are many subgames to consider, whenever useful, we break-up the analysis to several cases or Lemmata.
Stage 5:
In the last stage of the game, the politician, who won the election, will choose an allocation of resources such that he maximizes his utility, given the constraints set by legislators and the participation constraint of agents. The relevant constraints is the dimensions of commitment of the political proposals and the maximum taxation constraint. The following analysis shows the equilibrium outcome for each potential combination of restrictions.
First, assume that the maximum taxation constraint is not set by legislators. Then, there are four cases to consider. Case 1: Proposals are committing on both dimensions. In this case, the politician implements the allocation which he initially proposed. Otherwise, the constitutional constraints are violated and agents receive the allocation a f m .
Case 2: Proposals are committing only on the dimension of taxation. The politician collects the promised taxes, but he does not necessarily use them in the production of the public good. Part of them may be consumed along with his endowment of the private good. The level of public good produced is the solution to the problem max xp,y u p (x p , y), subject to: x p e p + i =p t i − y/m, where agent p is the politician in power. Case 3: Proposals are committing only on the quantity of the public good. The politician collects the maximum taxation from each agent so that his participation constraint is not violated (t i : u i (e i − t i , y) = v f m i ). Since the politician is committed on the level of public good, he consumes the excess taxation plus his endowment:
is a negative number, then the equilibrium outcome is the status quo a f m , because either the necessary taxation for the production of the public good violates the participation constraint of at least one agent or the commitment on its level is violated.
Case 4: Proposals are not committing on either dimension. Then, the level of public good and taxation for each agent is chosen so that the politician maximizes his utility subject only to the individual participation constraints. The politician acts as an unrestrained social dictator.
Consider these four cases when the maximum taxation constraint is set by legislators. Case 1 (Proposals are committing on both dimensions): The politician implements his proposals and there is no leeway for additional extraction of social surplus. If the proposal sets taxation that violates the willingness-to-pay of some agent, then the final allocation is a f m . Of course, this affects the behavior of voters and politicians in the previous sub-games.
Case 2 (Proposals are committing only on the dimension of taxation): Again, if the taxation promised violates the maximum taxation constraint, then the equilibrium allocation is a f m . Otherwise, the analysis is the same as the case without the taxation constraint.
Case 3 (Proposals are committing only on the quantity of the public good): Given the level of the public good promised, the politician imposes the maximum taxation possible so that both the maximum taxation constraint and the participation constraint are not violated. Since the politician is committed on the level of public good, the excess taxation becomes private consumption for the politician. Similarly to previous cases, if the taxation that meets the relevant constraints is not enough to finance the level of public good, the equilibrium allocation is a f m . Case 4 (Proposals are not committing on either dimension): The politician chooses the level of public good and the level of taxation such that he maximizes his utility, given the two sets of constraints. As in Case I of section 3, the politician can provide very low levels of public good, where the maximum willingness-to-pay is very high, and extract part of the social surplus for himself. This generally implies positive political rents.
Stage 4:
Since agents anticipate the choices of politicians is stage 5 given the institutional constraints, they simply vote for the politician, whose final allocation or resources provides them the highest utility. For simplicity, if many politicians make the same proposal or if their proposals are different, but they imply the same final utility for an agent, then he is indifferent between them and votes randomly with equal probability for each one of them.
Each agent estimates the final allocation of resources, which is implied by each political offer, by taking into consideration the institutional constraints and the incentives of the political when he comes in power. If a political proposal is such that either an institutional constraint or individual participation constraint will be violated in stage 5, then the agents expects that the final allocation of the respective proposal is a f m . On the other hand, if the maximum utility that politician p can attain if he is elected in office implies that the participation constraint of agent i is binding, then the imputed utility of agent i by voting for proposal p is v f m . If all political proposals that agent i is facing belong either to the first or the second set above, then he is effectively indifferent between either of them.
Stage 3:
Politicians anticipate agents' behavior and make proposals according to the restrictions set by the legislators, the degree of political competition and participation constraints. If there is only one politician, then his proposal is the one that maximizes his utility without violating any of the constraints. In this case, political rents are strictly positive as demonstrated in Case I of section 3.
But, if there are at least two politicians, then a political proposal is the best response to the offers that the other politicians make. Consider first the case where there is no commitment on both policy dimensions and the maximum taxation constraint does not hold.
Lemma 1: Under no commitment on any element of political proposals, no maximum taxation constraint and political competition, political offers do not affect the equilibrium of the sub-game and politicians make strictly positive political rents.
Proof: The Proof follows from the analysis of stages 4 and 5. Since proposals are not committing, the politician who wins the election will choose an allocation of resources that makes the participation constraints of all other agents binding. Since voters anticipate that, they expect the same utility level irrespectively of whom they vote or political platforms. Therefore, they are indifferent between politicians and vote randomly. In stage 3, politicians anticipate this behavior and make any offer.
In the case where political proposals are not committing but the maximum taxation constraint holds political offers still do not matter but the identity of the politician does. Nevertheless, the utility that the rest of the agents receive will be weakly less than the one they receive under the Lindahl allocation.
Lemma 2: Under no commitment on any element of political proposals, political competition and the maximum taxation constraint holding, political offers are irrelevant for voting behavior, but the preferences of the politicians matter. Furthermore, the equilibrium utility level of the agents in the economy, excluding the agent in power, is weakly less than the utility they receive under the Lindahl equilibrium.
Proof: Political proposals are not committing and hence they are not credible. In the last stage of the game, the politician maximizes his utility subject to the participation and maximum taxation constraints. This means that if the politician chooses to produce the level of public good y, he will impose the maximum taxation possible to each agent for that level of public good and place agents on their respective offer curves (as long as their participation constraints are not violated). Also, recall that, due to the assumptions on preferences, the utility level of an agent along his offer curve is strictly increasing and that participation constraints are not binding if the Lindahl allocation is provided.
Politician p can not produce any level of the public good above the Lindahl allocation, because this either violates the maximum taxation constraint for some agent or it is not feasible. If the politician chooses the Lindahl level of public good it will also impose taxation consistent with the Lindahl allocation, so that agent i receives the final utility that corresponds to the Lindahl equilibrium v L i . This is because the summation of the maximum willingness-to-pay of all agents is exactly equal to the inputs needed to produce the public good at the Lindahl allocation and, hence, any other taxation scheme violates the maximum taxation constraint for at least one agent.
If the politician in power, reduces the level of public good below the Lindahl then his utility may increase because the maximum willingness-to-pay of the agents relaxes and he can extract political rents for private consumption, but it also may decrease because the level of public good is reduced. Adopting the same notation as before, t
is the maximum taxation which can imposed on agent i for the level of public good y, where s m i (y) is the maximum willingness-to-pay of agent i. Given that the budget constraint of the politician is given by x p + y/m e p + i =p t m i (y), the overall effect in his utility by a small reduction of the public good below the Lindahl level is given by:
In the sum above, the first term in the bracket is positive and reflects the marginal increase in utility due to the increase in the consumption of the private good, while the second term is negative and reflects the marginal decrease in utility due to the decrease of the public good. If the first term is greater than the second in absolute values, then the politician prefers to decrease the level of public good below the Lindahl. In this case, agents final utility decreases as they move along their offer curves to lower levels of public good. If the second term is greater than the first, then the politician imposes the Lindahl allocation of the economy.
In stage 4 agents anticipate this behavior by the politician. Therefore, they vote for the politician who will impose the highest level of public good in stage 5, and this voting behavior is independent of any political proposal. As a consequence, any combination of political proposals in stage 3 is an equilibrium of this sub-game and agents, except for the preferred politician, receive at most the utility levels of the Lindahl allocation (v L ).
Next, we consider the case when there is commitment over the level of the public good and there is no commitment over taxation. Lemmata 3 and 4 examine the cases where the maximum taxation constraint does not hold or holds, respectively.
Lemma 3: Under commitment on the level of public good, no commitment on taxation, no maximum taxation constraint and political competition, political offers do not affect the equilibrium of the sub-game and politicians make strictly positive political rents.
Proof:
The proof follows similar arguments as Lemma 1. Since there is no commitment on taxation, in stage 5, the politician chooses an individual taxation such that it makes the participation constraint of each agent binding, irrespectively of the level of public good produced. As a result, agents are indifferent whom to vote for in stage 4. In stage 3, politicians propose the level of public good that maximizes their utility given the participation and feasibility constraints.
Lemma 4: Under no commitment on taxation, commitment on the level of public good, political competition and the maximum taxation constraint, all politicians propose the level of the public good that corresponds to the Lindahl allocation of the economy.
Proof: The result follows from Proposition 3.
Below, we consider the sub-games where proposals on individual taxation are committing. As we mentioned earlier, the analysis of these sub-games is done through a sequential bargaining approach.
Lemma 5: Under no commitment on the level of the public good, commitment on the level of taxation, political competition and no maximum taxation constraint, non-politicians, legislators including, receive strictly less utility than their respective utility under the Lindahl allocation.
Proof: Let P max = {t max P , y max P }, be the political proposal that maximizes the utility of politician p under only the participation constraints. It is easy to check that all participation constraints are binding under P max . Also, let v max p be the utility level that he receives under P max . Let also E be the total number of votes required for passing a proposal, n+1 2 E n. Then, in the last stage of political offers of the sequential bargaining procedure, stage T , the politician who makes the offer makes any offer P = {t max , y}. If the politician is elected and since there is no commitment on the level of the public good, the best response of the politician in stage 5 is to choose y max P . Therefore, agents vote for the proposal in stage 4, because they anticipate that their participation constraints are binding. As a result, the expected utility of a politician p at the beginning of stage T is equal to:
p , where K is the total number of politicians. Note that the expected utility of a non-politician i at the beginning of stage T is v f m i . In the bargaining stage T − 1, the chosen politician q can win the approval of nonpoliticians by offering Q = t Q , y such that u i (t Q,i , y
. If the number of nonpoliticians is greater than the election threshold, n − K E, then politician q secures election by proposal Q. Otherwise proposal Q must be such that u i (t Q,i , y
for the n − K non-politicians and u p (t Q,p , y
If such a proposal Q is not feasible then politician q can not receive adequate support for any of his offers and the game moves to stage T . The same reasoning applies to any bargaining stage t T . This means that in any sub-game perfect equilibrium of the sub-game with commitment on taxation and no maximum taxation constraint, the maximum equilibrium payoff of non-politicians,
Corollary 1: Under commitment on both the level of the public good and individual taxation, political competition and no maximum taxation constraint, non-politicians, legislators including, receive strictly less utility than their respective utility under the Lindahl allocation.
Proof: In the last bargaining stage, the proposing politician offers P max = {t max P , y max P }, instead of the greater set of proposals P . The rest of the analysis follows Lemma 5.
Notice that the result of Lemma 5 is independent of any recognition rule, which is the probability that a politician is chosen to make a proposal in the bargaining stage. The only crucial assumption for the result is that the set of legislators and the set of politicians are disjoint. Finally, Lemma 6 and its Corollary establish a similar result for the case where the maximum taxation constraint holds.
Lemma 6: Under no commitment on the level of the public good, commitment on the level of taxation, political competition and the maximum taxation constraint, non-politicians, legislators including, receive weakly less utility than their respective utility under the Lindahl allocation.
Proof: The only difference from Lemma 5, is that, in this case, politicians can not tax agents more than their maximum willingness-to-pay due to the maximum taxation constraint in stage 5, which relates the analysis to Lemma 2. Let P mw = {textbf t mw P , y mw P } be the policy that maximizes the utility of politician p under the maximum taxation and individual participation constraints. As we proved in Lemma 2, y mw y L and therefore for any agent i other than the politician it holds that
. Then, in the last stage of proposals, stage T , if politician p is chosen, he makes any offer P = {t mw P , y} and agents vote for it. Given the set of such proposals for all politicians, the rest of the proof follows the proof of Lemma 5.
Corollary 2: Under commitment on both the level of the public good and individual taxation, political competition and the maximum taxation constraint, non-politicians, legislators including, receive weakly less utility than their respective utility under the Lindahl allocation.
Proof: Corollary 2 is a direct implication of Lemma 5 and Corollary 1.
Lemmata 1-6 and Corollaries 1 and 2 exhaust all the possible sub-games of stage 3, given the choices of legislators in stage 2.
Stage 2:
Given the previous analysis, it becomes clear that the critical stage is stage 2, where legislators decide what type of Constitution to set once they have observed the set of agents who decide to become politicians in stage 1. The analysis follows from Lemmata 1-6 and Corollaries 1 and 2, which establish the following results:
I) It is a strictly dominant strategy for legislators to set the maximum taxation constraint.
II) Given that the maximum taxation constraint is set, it is a weakly dominant strategy for legislators to make political proposals committing on the level of the public good and not on taxation. In the case where some politician p satisfies the condition of Lemma 2 (i.e. his most preferred level of the public good under the maximum taxation constraint is the one which corresponds to the Lindahl allocation), then legislators are indifferent between making proposals non-committing on both dimensions and making proposals committing on the level of the public good only. In the case where all politicians satisfy the condition of Lemma 2, then legislators are also indifferent between any institutional choice on the committment of political proposals.
III) The above results are independent of the number of votes required for winning the election and therefore any Election Rule for politicians is consistent with them.
Results I, II and III describe the sub-game perfect equilibria of stage 2. Legislators set any Election Rule, impose the maximum taxation constraint and, depending on the preferences of politicians, they choose either to make proposals committing on the level of the public good only or to make proposals non-committing or any other choice on the dimensions of commitment. However, the commitment of proposals to the public good and not taxation is the most general case because it is an equilibrium of the game under any specification of preferences for politicians which satisfy our original assumptions. The other types of equilibria hold only for specific preference profiles and do not characterize our game generically.
Stage 1:
Finally, in stage one agents have to decide whether to become politicians or legislators. If none of them becomes a legislator, then no rules are set for the political process, which means that political proposals are not committing on any dimension and the maximum taxation constraint is not set. Irrespectively of who receives the power in stage 5, the rest of the agents receive the same utility as the utility under free markets. Therefore, in stage 1, at least one agent becomes a legislator and increases his payoff by imposing the institutional restrictions described above.
If no agent becomes a politician, then no proposal is made in stage 3 and the decision process breaks down. Given that the other agents are either legislators or citozens, agent k has an incentive to become a politician and increase his welfare by making the proposal of a dictator, as in section 2. This can not be an equilibrium either because at least one more of the agents who are legislators or citizens has an incentive to change his decision, become politician and increase his utility by competing with agent k for the control of the government. Therefore, at least two agents will become politicians and at least one will become legislator. However, if these minimum requirements on political positions are satisfied, the exact number of politicians and legislators does not matter for the final allocation. Therefore, the sub-game perfect equilibrium allocation of the political game is described by Proposition 4.
First, this result is based only on two crucial assumptions: i) the Anonymity of the Taxation Constraint and ii) the restriction that an agent can hold only one power. The rest of the assumptions can be relaxed without affecting the equilibria of the game. For instance, the choice rule through which legislators decide the Constitution plays no role, since in equilibrium, all legislators agree on the desirable set of restrictions. We use it only for the facilitation of the analysis. Also, the assumption that the economy has a unique Lindahl allocation is not critical for our results (see footnote 9).
Second, since the Lindahl equilibrium is Pareto optimal, the proposed political game achieves an efficient allocation of resources in an economy with public goods. This is an important result since the economic literature of political games so far has not managed to achieve efficient allocations.
Third, in our game, almost all political institutions required for the implementation of an efficient allocation of resources, arise endogenously. Legislators decide what type of restrictions to set to voters and politicians. Proposals are also made endogenously by politicians. The anonymity condition and the separation of powers are the only institutions which are not created by agents. However, as far as separation of powers is concerned, it should be noted that agents have the choice between utilizing this institution or not. Since both types of power are used in equilibrium, it makes sense to say that separation of powers emerges endogenously.
Conclusion
Centralized decision making is very helpful for the solution of the free riding problem, but, without any set of restrictions on the authority that implements it, inefficiencies, in the form of political rents, arise. This paper shows why political competition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for political efficiency. Other forms of institutional restrictions, like restrictions to maximum taxation, are required for aligning political incentives with societal interests, so that voting games achieve equilibria, which otherwise they would not have. It is also worth noting that we focus our analysis on public goods, because private goods do not exhibit externalities and therefore, if centralized decisions fail to provide efficient outcomes, this is not crucial for societal welfare. Competitive markets could be used, instead, to allocate resources. In other words, the reason why we examine the role of political institutions is exactly because they impact the efficiency of social decisions when they are needed the most: to solve problems which involve public goods.
We take our analysis one step further, by asking whether and how the required political institutions can emerge endogenously. The answer we give to this question is to the affirmative. In the extended political game of section 4, we show how separation of power can arise endogenously and how legislators select appropriate institutions in order to limit the extractive powers of politicians. Thus, the point we make is that whenever collective decisions may increase societal welfare, agents have an incentive to devise and agree upon appropriate political institutions so that the decision process does not break down. In fact, because the equilibrium outcomes of our game coincide with the Lindahl allocations of the economy, we can say that agents have the incentive to devise appropriate institutions so that they limit the rents of politicians.
There is a variety of dimensions which our game can be extended to, while retaining its power, and most of these dimensions were discussed in the preceding sections. Our next step is to generalize the game for economies with multiple public goods and find if additional political institutions are necessary for achieving the same set of equilibria. We also intend to examine how these institutions can emerge by the actions of the agents. Another question of interest is whether our results can be extended to economies with asymmetric information. In this case, what are the political incentives for selecting a specific mechanism and through which institutions do agents align political interests with their own? We are currently working on the first extension, while we leave the second for future research.
